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ABSTRACT
The issue of how to support situation awareness among crews of modem commercial
aircraft is becoming especially important with the introduction of automation in the form of
sophisticated flight management computers and expert systems designed to assist the crew.
In this paper, cognitive theories are discussed that have relevance for the definition and
measurement of situation awareness. These theories suggest that comprehension of the
flow of events is an active process that is limited by the modularity of attention and memory
constraints, but can be enhanced by expert knowledge and strategies. Three implications of
this perspective for assessing and improving situation awareness are considered: (1)
scenario variations are proposed that tax awareness by placing demands on attention; (2)
experimental tasks and probes are described for assessing the cognitive processes that
underlie situation awareness; and (3) the use of computer-based human performance
models to augment the measures of situation aware0ess derived from performance data is
explored. Finally, two potential example applications of the proposed assessment
techniques are described, one concerning spatial awareness using wide field of view
displays and the other emphasizing fault management in aircraft systems.
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INTRODUCTION
The term situation awareness is in-
creasingly finding its way into the litera-
ture on the human factors of system de-
velopment. In everyday parlance, it
means the up-to-the-minute cognizance
required to operate or maintain a system.
It is generally agreed that expert pilots
maintain intimate and meticulously up-
dated knowledge of the state of their air-
craft and its support systems. Although
such situation awareness contributes to
good performance, it is not synonymous
with it. It is possible to have good situa-
tion awareness and still not be a good pi-
lot because of poor motor skills,
coordination or attitude problems.
Conversely, under automated flight
conditions it is possible to have good
performance with minimal situation
awareness. Indeed, much of this
knowledge may be superfluous in the
case of routine flights. However, when
emergencies arise and aids can no longer
be relied upon, the completeness and
currency of the pilot's situation
awareness are critical to the ability to
make decisions, revise plans, and
manage the aircraft.
In aviation communities there is in-
creasing concern about whether the ap-
propriate level of situation awareness is
being acquired and maintained by crew s .
One focus of attention is on the extent to
which automation that is designed to
reduce crew workload serves inad-
vertently to decrease their situation
the crew to acquire and maintain certain
aspects of situation awareness.
WHY MEASURE SITUATION
AWARENESS?
Reason (1990), in his discussion of
human error, distinguishes between
"unsafe acts" and "precursors of unsafe
acts." Our goal in developing techniques
for measuring situation awareness is to
help uncover information-processing
precursors of unsafe acts. Analyses of
scenarios that tax situational awareness
may reveal shortcomings of user-aids
that would not be evident in a less de-
manding scenario. Similarly, the use of
probes and experimental tasks may un-
cover misconceptions and maladaptive
processing strategies that are inconse-
quential under normal circumstances, but
could be detrimental in an emergency.
The ultimate goals of designing and
training to enhance situation awareness
depend on having satisfactory quantita-
tive methods for measuring it. The de-
velopment of measuring instruments,
however, requires that the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in achieving and main-
taining situation awareness be under-
stood. Several seminal papers have ex-
plored the information-processing de-
mands on the commercial or military
pilot (Beringer & Hancock, 1989;
Endsley, 1988; 1989; Fracker, 1988;
Regal, Rogers, & Boucek, 1988; Sarter
& Woods, 1991; Whitaker & Klein,
1988).
The objective of this report is to ex-
awareness. It is argued that as automa- pand upon this work by: (a) developing
tion takes over functions previously as- a theoretical framework based on psy-
signed to the crewmembers, they lose chological theory for understanding sit-
contact with the information needed to uation awareness, (b) using the frame-
perform and monitor these functions, the
very information that is essential to ef-
fective decision-making in the event of a
malfunction or emergency situation.
On the other hand, the advent of high
technology or "glass cockpits" has
opened up the design space to include
"smart" information retrieval, large
screen pictorial displays and even three-
dimensional displays. These advances
offer the potential to make it easier for
work to derive new strategies for assess-
ing situation awareness experimentally,
and (c) applying the proposed strategies
to some sample assessment problems.
SITUATION AWARENESS AND PILOT
ERROR
The problem of maintaining situation
awareness in the modern, semi-auto-
mated cockpit has been brought to public
attention through several dramatic inci-
dents involving pilot error. One such in-
cident involved a China Airlines 747 jet
near San Francisco:
The Taiwanese pilots, including a relief
captain and flight engineer, had been flying
nearly 10 hours, most of the time gazing at
their instruments and watching the autopilot
system navigate and fly the airplane. When
the 747 went through a bit of turbulence, the
auto throttle system, programmed to main-
rain a constant airspeed, first pulled the
throttles back to reduce power from the en-
gines and then, about 30 seconds later, in-
creased the power to prior levels, just as it
was supposed to. However, the outboard
engine on the right wing did not respond
fully, and despite the flight engineer's at-
tempts to cope with the situation, the engine
quit. The 747 has four engines, so the loss
of one engine at high altitude is not even
considered an emergency and is easily han-
dier. Had the captain completely turned off
the autopilot and followed correct proce-
dures, the flight would have continued with-
out incident....
The loss of the engine had caused the air-
plane to try to turn to the right. Sensing this,
the autopilot began deflecting the control
wheel in the cockpit to the left, attempting to
stop the turn. With his attention focused, in-
appropriately and almost exclusively on the
engine problem, the captain failed, according
to the N.T.S.B. report, to realize that the air-
plane and the autopilot had become engaged
in a vigorous tug-of-war. The airplane was
trying harder and harder to turn, or roll, to
the right because of the dead engine, and the
autopilot was struggling to prevent this and
keep the airplane level, as programmed.
Although the struggle between the two
machines went on for nearly four minutes,
the N.T.S.B's analysis afterward found, the
captain was entirely oblivious to it because
he was letting the autopilot fly and did not
actually have his hands on the control
wheel .... Finally, he disconnected the au-
topilot and took hold of the control wheel to
fly the airplane himself. In that instant, the
airplane immediately won the tug of war
with the autopiloL The effect was similar to
what happens in a real tug of war when one
side, at a previously arranged signal, sud-
denly lets go of the rope... The 747 rolled
dramatically to the right .... The roll contin-
ued and within a few seconds the 747 was on
its back, plummeting earthward (Stockton,
1988, p. 63).
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Fortunately, the incident ended with-
out loss of life. The pilot recovered the
plane at 10,000 feet, but not before the
passengers had spent some time hanging
upside down from their seatbelts. This
incident provides an example of the
problems that can occur when the trans-
fer of control from automated equipment
to human crewmember is carried out
without appropriate awareness of the full
situation.
How HAS SITUATION AWARENESS
BEEN DEFINED?
The China Airlines incident
described above helps to make the point
that many factors are involved in
achieving situation awareness. It is not
surprising, therefore, that researchers
have yet to agree on a definition of it.
Consider, for example, the following two
definitions:
[Situation awareness] means that the pilot
has an integrated understanding of factors
that will contribute to the safe flying of the
aircraft under normal or non-normal
conditions. The broader this knowledge is,
the greater the degree of situational
awareness (Regal, Rogers, & Boucek, 1988,
p. 65).
[Situation awareness is] the perception of
the elements in the environment within a
volume of time and space, the
comprehension of their meaning and the
projection of their status in the near future
(Endsley, 1988, p. 97).
These definitions, which are repre-
sentative of those in the literature, differ
in their emphasis on knowledge (i.e.,
product) and perception (i.e., process) re-
spectively. Yet they both seem to
capture the key features of situation
awareness: an understanding of the
meaning of events and the ability to
anticipate the consequences of taking or
failing to take particular actions.
A COGNITIVE VIEW OF SITUATION
AWARENESS
We distinguish the process of achiev-
ing situation awareness, which is
sometimes called situation assessment,
from its product or consequences. The
state of awareness with respect to
information and knowledge is the
product. The process, in contrast,
involves an active and dynamic series of
cognitive activities. Maintenance of
situation awareness is not easy because
the process requires mental resources
that may be in competition with on-
going task performance. The infor-
mation gathering activities that
contribute to situation awareness there-
fore may heighten workload momentar-
ily. However, a principal benefit of
achieving situation awareness is that the
operator or crewmember is prepared to
deal with upcoming events such that the
extreme surges in workload that can oc-
cur in unexpected circumstances are
avoided.
The development of suitable mea-
surement techniques requires an under-
standing of the process by which situa-
tion awareness is achieved within the
workload constraints imposed by the
multiple tasks confronting the pilot. In
broad perspective, although the
crewmembers spend much of their time
in routine, repetitive activities, a number
of different, potentially knowledge-in-
tensive and procedurally-complex tasks
may demand attention at any moment.
Each of these tasks is usually triggered
by a stimulus event, such as a communi-
cation from Air Traffic Control (ATC) or
a warning light, and, in order to obtain
proper interpretation, may require that
the crew initiate additional information-
seeking behavior. The aircrew needs to
be prepared for these tasks by having ad-
equate understanding of the situation and
knowing exactly what additional infor-
mation is needed. For each such alerting
signal or event, the crew must determine
its relevance, its procedural and goal-re-
lated implications, and its urgency.
Especially for the experienced crew,
such events may often call forth highly
practiced patterns and result in
"automatic" responses that do not add to
the workload. If not, however, as_,_,,ing
their significance may require access to
the full range of human memory struc-
tures. The effort required to retrieve as-
sociated data and knowledge necessary
for deciding on a course of action neces-
sarily results in an increase in mental
workload. The framework we propose
for understanding situation awareness
draws on research and theory in cogni-
tive psychology, particularly work on
perception and cognition and on memory
and attention.
NEISSERIS THEORY OF THE
PERCEPTUAL CYCLE
Neisser (1976) has formulated a view
of the integration of perception and cog-
nition that provides a useful way of
thinking about situation awareness for
several reasons. First, it resolves the ten-
sion between knowledge and perception
that is evident in the above definitions of
situation awareness. Building on Bartlett
(1932) and Gibson (1979), Neisser ar-
gued that knowledge, in the form of
schemas, or mental models, leads to an-
ticipations of certain kinds of informa-
tion and directs attention and exploratory
movements to particular aspects of the
available information (See Figure 1).
The information that the perceiver picks
up from the environment, or samples
from the available information, in turn,
modifies, or updates, what the perceiver
knows about the immediate surroundings
and influences what is known about the
world in general. Situation awareness, in
this framework, can be seen as both
product and process. As product, situa-
tion awareness is the state of the schema.
As process, situation awareness is the
state of the perceptual cycle at any given
moment. Situation awareness can be
thought of as "the big picture" or context
in which to interpret the flow of events.
It allows the perceiver to attend to the
right information at the right level of ab-
straction for the right task. It facilitates
the handling and scheduling of multiple
tasks and prevents overload. Strategies
for reducing workload in multiple task
situations will be touched upon in a later
section.
Neisser's view of perception can also
be expressed in terms of the new connec-
tionist theories arising out of work on
parallel distributed processing systems
(Norman, 1986). In these theories,
newly perceivedfeaturesare thoughtto
be associatedwith other, pre-existing
featuresthroughexcitatoryor inhibitory
connections basedon past experience
with thosefeatures. Maintaining situa-
tion awareness,in theseterms,is theop-
timal adjustmentof weights,or tuningof
thesystem,to anticipatethearrivingdata
with minimal discrepancy.
Neisser's (1976) view of the
perceptual cycle. Copyright © by
W.H. Freeman and Company.
Reprinted with permission.
A second advantage to Neisser's ap-
proach to perception is that it emphasizes
the role of meaning or comprehension
that was mentioned in both of the above
definitions. Following Gibson (1979),
Neisser handles the problem of meaning
by making it an integral part of the per-
ceptual cycle.
The information picked up in vision is
necessarily optical, consisting of patterns in
the light over space and time. But optical
information can specify objects and events at
various levels of abstraction and meaning.
When we perceive [a person's] mood, we are
not engaged in the same perceptual cycle as
when we are attending to his lip movements.
We develop a different (though perhaps
overlapping) set of anticipations; we pick up
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information that extends over a different
span of time (Neisser, 1976, p. 21).
A third advantage to this approach is that
it handles the anticipatory processes that
are mentioned in Endsley's (1988)
def'mition and referred to as the ability to
"think ahead of the aircraft" in Regal et
al.'s (1988) discussion. In Neisser's per-
ceptual cycle, the anticipation of events
directs exploratory behavior.
Exploratory behavior can occur in many
different forms. Attention can be chan-
neled to new objects with or without eye
movements and with or without locomo-
tion. Anticipation can occur in each of
these situations. Anticipation can also
occur at different levels in the continuum
from perception to cognition. For exam-
ple, at the basic perceptual level, antici-
pation means a readiness to perceive cer-
tain information, as when the optical
flow specifies an impending collision or
the occlusion of another aircraft by cloud
cover. At the level of higher-order per-
ceptual strategies, anticipation means fo-
cusing attention efficiently, as when an
experienced driver (or taxiing pilot) fo-
cuses attention on a point at a distance
from the vehicle rather than directly in
front of it. At the cognitive level, antici-
pation means the consideration of possi-
ble outcomes. It includes knowledge-in-
tensive activities such as contingency
planning and diagnosis of system faults
that may impact the flight. This level is
best represented by Neisser's (1976) ex-
panded view of the perceptual cycle (See
Figure 2). The inner circle is the percep-
tual cycle shown in Figure 1. The outer
circle is a more general exploratory cycle
that includes actions taken to obtain in-
formation that is not present in the im-
mediate environment. This kind of ex-
ploratory behavior is based upon knowl-
edge of the world and its possibilities.
At each of these levels, anticipation
serves to help in the management of
workload. Attentiveness to potentially
important parameters during periods of
low workload makes the perceptual pro-
cess more efficient during periods of
high workload, thereby protecting
against overload.
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Neisser's (1976) expanded view of the perceptual cycle. Copyright © by
W.H. Freeman and Company. Reprinted with permission.
REAL-WORLD CONSTRAINTS ON
SITUATION AWARENESS
Having borrowed Neisser's notion of
the perceptual cycle to clarify what we
mean by situation awareness, we now
turn to the important question of why it
sometimes is and sometimes is not
achieved. To answer this question, we
need to consider the task that the pilot is
trying to accomplish, the nature of the
information that is available, the inherent
constraints on human processing capa-
bilities, and the nature of expertise.
The Pilot's Job
The most striking characteristic of
the pilot's job is the multiplicity of tasks
that must be accomplished. For exam-
ple, at 2500 feet during an approach to-
wards a rain storm, the pilot may have to
perform the following:
• Monitor the descent (e.g., compare
actual to desired flight path, airspeed
etc.).
• Perform the prelanding checklist.
• Set the flaps/slats.
• Receive radio messages from ATC to
reduce speed and watch for traffic.
• Enter the new altitude restriction into
the Mode Control Panel (or equiva-
lent).
• Look out the window for traffic.
• Respond to ATC about traffic seen or
not ("seen" means pilot assumes re-
sponsibility for separation).
• Worry about the presence of
windshear by looking for virga,
lightning, or dust-rings.
• Watch airspeed, especially for evi-
dence of a windshear encounter.
• Ignore radio traffic to other aircraft
except where it contains warnings of
nearby hazards.
• Monitor the copilot's performance.
Most of these tasks are triggered by
specific events and many have a time
frame during which they must be corn-
5
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pleted. Most require careful monitoring
of information sources.
The Available Information
In carrying out these tasks, the pilot
must be attentive to numerous sources of
information. There is an ongoing stream
of sensory information from the envi-
ronment as well as cockpit visual and
auditory displays, manuals, checklists,
and communication from within or from
outside the aircraft. Some of these in-
formation sources can be consulted at
will, others intrude at unexpected times.
For example, the following sensory
events, all of potential significance, may
occur in sequence while the pilot is in
the midst of an approach:
• A flash of lightning.
• An altitude glitch that results from
turbulence.
• Other signs of turbulence.
• A radio transmission.
• A speed reading that is right for
flaps-down.
For each of these data or events, the
pilot must determine relevance, procedu-
ral implications, and urgency. This de-
termination can be more or less effortful,
depending on factors that relate to hu-
man information-processing constraints.
These constraints will be discussed in the
next section.
Thus far we have described the mul-
tiplicity of tasks facing the pilot and the
multiple sources of information to which
the pilot must attend. Now we will con-
sider the factors that affect the degree of
effort that the pilot must exert to deter-
mine the significance of the incoming
information. We will discuss two major
factors: (a) the depth of the analysis re-
quired and, (b) the extent to which atten-
tion to the input requires a change in fo-
cus or context.
Depth of Analysis Required
In some circumstances, the pilot can
choose to ignore or attend to incoming
information on the basis of simple di-
mensions, such as location or modality.
Location within the cockpit provides in-
6
formation about the function of certain
inputs (e.g., primary flight displays are
for control and guidance information,
map is for navigation information).
Cockpit location also provides informa-
tion about the criticality of certain inputs
(e.g., warnings are listed above cautions
which are listed above advisories).
Criticality is also specified by modality
(e.g., the distinctive sound that signals a
warning).
While the relevance of some inputs
can be determined easily, the relevance
of others is not signalled by either source
or modality, but depends on its relation-
ship to some particular aspect of the
flight situation. For example, in an ap-
proach to landing, the significance of a
radio message cannot be determined
without further processing: a message
from ATC to reduce speed and watch for
traffic would certainly be relevant, a re-
port from the preceding pilot would be
relevant if it contained information about
a potential hazard, a communication ad-
dressed to another pilot would be irrele-
vant, unless the pilot were nearby and it
described conditions at the relevant air-
port, and finally, a radio weather report
would be relevant if it pertained to the
right part of the country.
While the significance of a warning
or radio communication is relatively un-
ambiguous, many of the inputs that pilots
receive require additional information
before their relevance can be determined.
For example, a turbulence report en route
to an airport could signal weather diffi-
culties at the destination or merely a tem-
porary disturbance. A simulation study
involving precisely these circumstances
showed that only the best pilots took the
implications of the turbulence seriously
enough to seek information about cross-
winds at the designated airport; as a con-
sequence, only the best pilots were pre-
pared for the task of rerouting (Orasanu,
1990).
To summarize, one factor that influ-
ences whether and how easily an input
can be processed has to do with the
structure of the information. The signifi-
cance of certain inputs is directly speci-
fled by superficial, attention-getting fea-
tures while that of others requires deeper
processing and further acquisition of in-
formation.
Change in Focus or Context
The depth of processing required to
determine the significance of an input is
an important factor in determining
whether or not it will be properly at-
tended. Recent work on memory and at-
tention suggests that another factor af-
fecting the processing of an input is the
extent of the competing demands on the
pilot's attention at any given moment.
The bottom line is that human informa-
tion-processing capabilities are not well
suited to a multiplicity of simultaneous
tasks. Thoughtful attention is modular.
People can consciously think about only
one thing at a time. As a result, they do
not handle interruptions and distractions
very well. Research has shown that even
when an operator is faced with as few as
two tasks and the "tasks" consist of noth-
ing more than the detection or recogni-
tion of simple signals, the requirement to
divide or switch attention between them
may result in a significant loss in sensi-
tivity or time that can be allocated to ei-
ther (Broadbent, 1957; Schneider &
Detweiler, 1988; Swets, 1984).
In addition, research indicates that
mental shifts between topics or semantic
domains require measurable time and ef-
fort and are prone to certain classes of
biases and errors (Anderson & Pitchard,
1978; Bower, 1982; Sanford & Garrod,
1981; Schank et al., 1982). To the extent
that incoming information is unrelated to
the task in which the pilot is concurrently
engaged, its interpretation must involve
considerable mental workload. The
more time and effort the pilot invests in
its interpretation, the greater its potential
for blocking notice or proper interpreta-
tion of other available data. The less
time and effort invested in its interpreta-
tion, the greater the likelihood of mis-
e0nstruing its implications. These ideas
are captured in a theory about memory
and attention that will now be described.
RECONCEIVING THE DEMANDS ON
THE PILOT
A theory about memory and attention
developed by Sanford & Garrod (1981)
helps to clarify the cognitive demands on
the pilot even though, interestingly, it
was formulated to explain text compre-
hension. We will present the theory as it
was originally formulated, in terms of
the comprehension of events in a story,
and then show how it applies to the
comprehension of events in a flight.
Sanford and Garrod's Theory of
Memory and Attention
Sanford and Garrod (1981) theorized
that an individual's active memory con-
sists of two bins, explicit and implicit
focus. We find it convenient to think of
these two bins as replacing the box la-
beled "schema of present environment"
in Neisser's (1976) expanded view of the
perceptual cycle (See Figure 3). Explicit
focus corresponds roughly to what is
conventionally labeled as "working
memory." At any given moment, ex-
plicit focus contains a tightly-limited
number of interrelated tokens of (or
.pointers to) larger knowledge structures
m long-term memory. Although the
contents of explicit focus are regulated
more or less like a push-down stack, the
maintenance of any given token depends
not only on the recency with which it has
been activated by the text or situation but
also on its implicit relevance to the cur-
rent interpretive stream.
Implicit focus, in contrast, subtends
the full-blown representation of the sit-
uation that is partially represented in
explicit focus. Information relevant to
the knowledge in implicit focus cannot
be brought to the interpreter's attention
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with either the speed or the obliqueness
of reference that suffices for information
in explicit focus. On the other hand,
such information can be interpreted far
more quickly and with smaller increases
in workload than information that is un-
related to the contents of explicit focus.
To support these active memories,
Sanford and Garrod suggest that the
reader's long-term (currently inactive)
memory is also sectioned into two bins.
We think of these bins as replacing the
box labelled "cognitive map of the world
and its possibilities" in Neisser's ex-
panded view of the perceptual cycle (See
Figure 3). The first, episodic memory,
contains a complete record of the knowl-
edge structures that have been built or
accessed in the course of reading the cur-
rent text or, for our purposes, in the
context of the current flight.
Meanwhile, semantic memory con-
tains a person's lifetime accumulation of
knowledge in general. Knowledge in ei-
ther of these long-term memories can be
brought to consciousness only given
(1976) view of the perceptual cycle
considerable effort or strong cueing.
Requirements to do so are thus expected
to be relatively costly in terms of mental
workload.
Extrapolating from the literature on
text comprehension, we can anticipate
some of the parameters that will control
the ease or probability with which a
given event is properly processed by the
manager of real-world information.
Because these ideas have not been tested
or validated in the general domain of
real-time information management, this
extrapolation is speculative.
Events that are relevant to those as-
pects of a task on which a person is cur-
re ntly working should be readily assimi-
lated because they will map themselves
onto the knowledge currently in explicit
focus; thus, for example, the pilot will
readily notice and respond to changes in
the glideslope indication that occur in the
course of landing (See Figure 4). Events
that pertain to the task but not to the par-
ticular aspect of the task with which a
person is engaged are also expected to be
interpreted relatively quickly and co-
gently as they will map onto knowledge
in implicit focus; thus, for example, even
while tracking the glideslope, the pilot
may be readily alerted to changes in en-
gine noise that are consistent or inconsis-
tent with landing experience (See Figure
4). In contrast, when the interpretation
of an event requires consideration of
knowledge in long-term memory, the
probability or effort associated with its
proper processing will depend on such
factors as the transparency of its signifi-
cance and the time available for working
on it; thus, for example, very close to
touchdown, the pilot will be relatively
unprepared to receive and interpret unre-
lated communications.
Mission Categories
We find it useful to think of the tasks
that command the pilot's attention as
falling into the following mission cate-
gories:
• Macro-planning and-navigation.
• Local navigation, guidance and con-
trol.
• Communication outside the cockpit.
• Flight crew resource management.
• Cabin management.
• Routine management of physical
equipment, resources and systems.
° Routine management of Flight
Management Computer (FMC) and
related crew-aiding systems.
• Troubleshooting of physical equip-
ment, resources and systems.
• Troubleshooting of FMC and related
crew-aiding systems.
• Bridging activities (breaks, teaching
etc.).
Each of these categories has specific
goals associated with it, although the
goals in any one category may serve as
subgoals for another category. The work
by Sanford & Garrod (1981) on text
comprehension suggests further analo-
gous constraints on pilot behavior. First,
only one goal will be in explicit focus at
a time. Data relevant to a new concern
will more easily capture an operator's
attention upon completion of a goal or
subgoal. Although part of the goal
structure may be available in implicit or
explicit focus, the complete goal
structure may be available only through
long-term memory and thus require
effort to retrieve. As a result, the
necessity of switching to a task in
another mission category before com-
pletion of the fhst task could lead to less
than optimal deployment of attention on
either task. Switching to another task
within the same category will be less dis-
ruptive because the two tasks are likely
to have a common goal and common im-
plicit information.
The effort required to switch
attention between tasks in different
mission categories means that the
original task may be forgotten altogether,
since the goal is no longer in working
memory, especially if further distractions
prevent the pilot from focusing on the
goal structure long enough to reactivate
the original task from long-term
memory. Such memory lapses can be
dangerous.
An Airline Accident
Many of the airline accidents that
have been reported lend credence to the
above depiction of the limits on human
attention. An example is provided by a
recent accident at the Detroit
Metropolitan Airport (NTSB, 1988).
The aircraft took off without setting its
flaps and crashed. Although the crew
had begun the pre-flight checklist
properly (mission category: management
of physical equipment, resources, and
systems), they were interrupted by Air
Traffic Control before verifying the
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4
Hypothetical view of the pilot during landing. The boxes show the
contents of memory; the circles show the objects of awareness.
status of the flaps (mission category:
communication outside the cockpit).
Although they might still have resumed
the checklist routine prior to take-off
(management of physical equipment),
other issues usurped their attention: they
were confused as to which taxi-way to
use (local navigation), the runway direc-
tion had just been changed, and weather
and runway conditions were not
provided until the aircraft was already
taxiing (macro-planning).
Although, with proper handling, the
aircraft could have become airborne
without flaps, the crew had been given a
windshear alert. When the problem with
the flaps expressed itself during take-off,
the symptoms were interpreted -- and re-
sponded to -- as though they were caused
by windshear (See Figure 5). As Figure
5 illustrates, this misinterpretation is un-
derstandable in light of the salience of
windshear in the pilot's memory and the
similarity of symptoms in the two cases.
Very likely, the cost of this misinterpre-
tation was compounded by what
Norman, (1986) calls a tendency toward
"cognitive hysteresis," the fact that hu-
man information-processors are notori-
ously bad at seeking disconfirming evi-
dence once a hypothesis has been par-
fially confirmed. Evidently the distrac-
tions from the competing tasks left few
resources with which to counteract this
natural tendency to stand by an initial
decision. The Detroit incident, in short,
is typical of accidents resulting from
human error. A series of minor errors,
none of which was fatal in itself, to-
gether resulted in a disaster (Reason,
1990).
THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE
Next we briefly consider how experi-
enced pilots are able to perform the mul-
tiplicity of tasks without error, in spite of
inherent limitations on the human infor-
mation processing system. The limita-
tions are not so debilitating as they might
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Expectations based on a windshear alert caused the pilot to overlook the
true cause of the lift problem.
first appear because of the extreme
adaptability and resourcefulness of the
human cognitive system. Schneider &
Detweiler (1988) have identified seven
types of compensatory strategies that
people use to overcome performance
limitations in multi-task situations.
These strategies are thought to emerge
routinely in the course of practice on
multiple tasks, although the first two
may be specific to conditions of high
workload (Schneider & Detweiler,
1988).
Shedding, Delaying, and Preloading
Tasks
The first set of strategies consists of
the following:
Experience in performing multiple tasks
enables one to anticipate and monitor the
consequences of delaying or eliminating a
task (Schneider & Detweiler, 1988, p. 556).
In the China Airlines accident, the
pilot was preoccupied with looking out
the window at the defective engine with
the consequence that he delayed discon-
necting the auto pilot, with disastrous
results.
Preloading involves preprocessing infor-
mation prior to the onset of the critical
workload segment (Schneider & Detweiler,
1988, p. 556).
One aspect of preloading, contin-
gency planning, has been found to be
characteristic of expert flight crews.
Orasanu (1990) found that air crews who
were rated as most successful 'in a simu-
lated flight study (i.e., made the smallest
number of errors) differed from crews
rated less successful in the extent and
timing of their contingency planning.
Successful crews were likely to make
plans (e.g., regarding weather closing of
airports) and did so well in advance of
when they were needed. The less suc-
cessful crews, by contrast, were not pre-
pared for the rerouting and ended up
having to makes plans during a peak
workload (e.g., while having to deal with
a simultaneous hydraulics system fail-
are).
The picture we get here is of good
Captains who are planful, anticipate difficul-
ties, use time during the normal phase to
prepare for higher workload periods, and
who are ahead of the curve. They stop and
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think, then get information they need and
carry out their plans. Emergency actions are
rehearsed so the crew is primed to go into
action when the time comes (Orasanu, 1990,
p. 13).
Letting Go of Unnecessary High-
workload Strategies
The expert finds short-cuts that
reduce the workload. This aspect of
pilot performance is particularly
important when problems arise. The less
effort required to monitor the flight, the
more likely it is that the critical
monitoring function will be maintained
when the pilot has to deal simultaneously
with a system failure.
Utilizing Non-competing Resources
This strategy involves learning to
allocate task components to minimize re-
source competition. The experienced pi-
lot, for example, would be wary of carry-
ing out another task that used spatial
strategies while navigating, but would
feel free to engage in activities that used
quantitative strategies, such as
calculating flying time. Successful
cockpit resource management strategies
also fall into this category.
Multiplexing Transmissions Over
Time
This strategy has to do with optimiz-
ing the division of attention across tasks:
[Researchers] have shown that after
extended training, human operators
learn to sample instrument gauges at
the optimal rate based on the relative
information rate of each channel. The
allocation of internal control process-
ing may be tuned through experience
in a manner comparable to the way
the operators allocate attention among
gauges (Schneider & Detweiler, 1988,
p. 558).
Shortening Transmissions
This strategy consists of finding the
minimal time that can be spent in
looking at a gauge or source of
information without sacrificing accuracy.
Shorter viewing times also result, with
experience, from learning to ignore
irrelevant features and from chunking
(See below).
Converting Interference from
Concurrent Transmissions
This strategy involves finding ways
to reduce interference from competing
sources of information, by deliberate
shifts of attention. Tuning out words
spoken by your fellow crewmember
when ATC is contacting you about
something else is an example. The
crewmember's message may be re-
transmitted at a later time.
Chunking Transmissions
This strategy consists of grouping in-
formation into related clusters to over-
come the limits of working memory.
Work on expertise in many domains has
shown that the expert is more likely than
the novice to perceive the higher order
relations or patterns in the information
that permit chunking. In a replication of
an earlier work on chess masters, Chase
& Simon (1973) found that experts, who
were asked to reproduce the position of
chess pieces from a real game after a
brief glance, remembered more board
locations than did novices. Their
performance was not better than that of
novices, however, when the pieces were
randomly placed on the board. Thus, the
experts were able to encode legitimate
board arrangements into higher order
units that could be perceived in a glance.
In terms of flight management, we would
expect more experienced pilots to differ
from those with less experience in the
ease and accuracy with which the
patterns of information (i.e., "situations")
derived from the displays could be
perceived and remembered.
SUMMARY
By way of review, Table 1 presents
what we feel are the key elements of sit-
uation awareness discussed thus far. The
table is organized into three possible
classes of situations faced by the pilot:
routine, non-routine, and emergency.
These classes all involve anticipating or
"thinking ahead of the aircraft." This
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ability becomesincreasingly important
as the situation changes from a routine
flight to an emergency. Anticipation is
accomplished in routine situations
through the perceptual cycle depicted in
Figure 1. Emergency situations, which
require contingency planning and
diagnosis, are accomplished through the
larger exploration cycle, depicted in
Figure 3. For each of the situations in
Table 1, we specify the components that
can require attention and the benefits of
awareness. We then break down each of
the situations into the relevant mission
categories and summarize differences
between novice and expert performance.
STRATEGIES FOR THE MEASUREMENT
OF SITUATION AWARENESS
In this section we address the prob-
lem of assessing situation awareness.
This problem has been discussed in sev-
eral important papers (Beringer &
Hancock, 1989; Endsley, 1988; 1989;
Fracker, 1988; Regal, Rogers, & Boucek,
1988; Sarter & Woods, 1991; Whitaker
& Klein, 1988). The techniques that
have been emphasized thus far are the
probe technique and think-aloud proto-
cols. In the probe technique, a simula-
tion is expectediy or unexpectedly inter-
rupted and the crewmember is asked to
report on the state of various classes of
information reflective of the state of his
or her aircraft (Endsley, 1988; 1989). In
think-aloud protocols, the crewmember
is asked to provide a running narrative
explanation of what she or he is doing
during the execution of a scenario or
during a post-flight debriefing. The need
for reliable, sensitive measures suggests
that we exploit these conventional ap-
proaches, but that we also go beyond
them in order to broaden the scope of
measures and to capture more of the
properties of both the process and prod-
uct of situation awareness.
In the remainder of this section, we
discuss techniques for assessing situation
awareness. The idea is to provide a
range of strategies that can be fitted to
different needs. The application that
concerns us here is the evaluation of the
situation awareness afforded by pro-
posed new cockpit aids. However, we
believe the strategies that we are
proposing are general enough that they
can be applied in areas other than avia-
tion and to other assessment needs, such
as the evaluation of the effects of train-
ing programs or the development of cer-
tification requirements.
The strategies we will describe for
measuring situation awareness fall
into three categories:
• Measures derived from scenario ma-
nipulations: Situation awareness is
inferred from performance on spe-
cially designed scenarios that place a
demand on crewmembers' attentional
resources and are hypothesized to re-
quire a sufficient state of awareness
for good performance.
• Direct measures." Situation aware-
ness is inferred from a variety of
probes and experimental tasks that
tap the crew's knowledge and strate-
gies during a scenario or following a
brief vignette
• Model-based measures: Situation
awareness is inferred from the
performance of a computer program
that models the actions, knowledge
states, and information processing
strategies of a human (i.e., a flight
crewmember) for a given situation.
Although, we will discuss each of
these measurement categories separately,
they are intended to be used in combina-
tion.
MEASURES OF SITUATION
AWARENESS DERIVED FROM
SCENARIO MANIPULATIONS
We believe that with proper scenario
design, much can be revealed about the
situation awareness of the crewmember
through performance measures alone.
The key to designing scenarios for this
purpose is to manipulate the demands on
attention. Under normal circumstances,
performance may not be a good indicator
of how easily the pilot can stay abreast
of the situation. A scenario in which
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Table 1
Characterlstics of Pilot Situation Awareness
i
External
Benefits of Mlsalon Information
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goals cation outside end auditory patterns Shortening
Robust the cockpit displays transmissions
Procedures decision
for sttalnlng making in Right crew Extra- end Converting
goals the face of: resource Intm-alrcraft Interference
management cornmunlca-
Aircraft Turbulence tion Chunking
system Cross winds Cabln
status Wlndshesr management Recorded flight
Loss of plans
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formance management Right menage-
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Routine Future 31)
management navigation
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Note." The rows are cumulative. In other words, the entries for emergency situations include all the entries
for routine and non-routine situations.
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events are entirely predictable and the ef-
fort required to assess the situation is
minimal is not likely to be be sensitive to
differences in situation awareness.
Therefore, scenario variations are needed
that place competing demands on atten-
tion. Attentional demands can be in-
creased in several ways (See section on
real-world constraints on situation
awareness). Two that are relevant for
the design of scenarios are:
• Increase the depth of processing re-
quired to comprehend the inputs.
• Arrange for a shift in attention or a
change of focus.
These factors give rise, respectively,
to the following strategies for assessing
situation awareness.
Design Scenarios with Subtle or
Misleading Indicators
The depth of processing required to
interpret an input in a scenario can be
manipulated by introducing either con-
flicting, potentially misleading, or very
subtle indicators. Situation awareness,
or the lack thereof, can be inferred from
the nature and timing of the choices
made. The idea is that instruments and
aids that provide good situation
awareness will enable the crewmember
to focus on subtle, but critical
information and avoid being led down
the "garden path" by information that is
potentially relevant, but turns out to be
inconsistent with the overall pattern.
definitive indicator, turbulence en route.
Only half the flight crews in her study
solicited this information. In this
example, the decision to seek
information about crosswinds would be a
good index of situation awareness.
The Detroit accident, discussed ear-
lier, is a clear case in which ambiguous
information, concerning windshear, led
to difficulties. Another is provided by
the Midlands plane crash (NTSB, 1989).
In this tragic incident, the pilot misinter-
preted the indicators concerning an
engine problem and turned off the good
right engine instead of the faulty left
engine. There were at least two
indicators that helped to mislead the
pilot, although there were other
indicators that would have clarified the
situation. First, there was smoke in the
cockpit and smoke is usually associated
with a problem in the right engine
because of venting patterns. Secondly,
there was a vibration that coincidentally
ceased after the right engine was turned
off, suggesting that the malfunction had
caused the vibration. One could
construct analogously ambiguous
experimental scenarios and use the time
and nature of subjects' decisions, e.g., to
turn off an engine, as an index to their
situation awareness.
Design Scenarios with Interruptions
Demands on attention can be
manipulated in a scenario by interrupting
the primary task for a period of time.
This approach was successfully applied The degree of disruption can be observed
to the evaluation of displays in a nuclear through the quality of the decisions that
power plant control room by Woods,
Wise, and Hanes (1982).
An example of a scenario with subtle
indicators is provided by Orasanu
(1990). In one of the scenarios in her
study, information about crosswinds at
are made as a result of having to divide
attention and the time needed to restore
the original context after the disruption.
The notion here is that cockpit aids that
increase situation awareness should help
the crewmember to deal with the
the
anticipatory information about a weather
closing at the destination airport. This
information was important because it
allowed the crew to plan ahead while the
workload was low. It was subtle,
however, because it had to be solicited
explicitly on the basis of another, less
airport provided definitive competing demands on attention
occasioned by an interruption.
The Detroit accident again provides a
case in point (See Figure 5).
Interruptions from ATC while the crew
was working on a checklist resulted in a
failure to return to that task and, conse-
quently, a failure to set the flaps -- and
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apparentlyto recall thattheflapshadnot
beenlowered -- before take-off. This
oversight had severeconsequencesbe-
causeotherfactorsconspiredto makethe
crewbelievetheproblemwas windshear
andpreventedthemfrom taking thecor-
rectactions.
Although it is not difficult to intro-
duce realistic interruptions into a sce-
nario,for purposesof assessmenti may
be sufficient to interrupt the ongoing
flow of information artificially by
blankingthecockpit displays. With this
paradigm,both the actionstaken while
"blind" andthe effort requiredto restore
the original context when the display
returnscan serveas an indicator of the
extent to which cockpit systemshave
supported the development and up-
dating of the crewmember's mental
model or "cognitive map." Further, by
altering certain data on "restoration," we
can make finer assessments of the scope
and focus of subjects' awareness.
DIRECT MEASURES OF SITUATION
AWARENESS
A number of more direct measures of
situation awareness can be obtained by
supplementing the scenario observations,
discussed above, with experimental tasks
and probes that shed light on the cogni-
tive processes underlying the crewmem-
ber's performance. We will describe
some assessment techniques that have
proven to be robust within the field of
experimental psychology and could be
adapted to the problem of assessing sit-
uation awareness. The four techniques
that will be discussed are:
• Queries.
• Recall of inputs.
• Category judgments (i.e., nor-
mal/abnormal).
• Information seeking/eye movements.
Queries
The technique of periodically query-
ing the crewmember about situational in-
formation, either during the scenario or
at the end, is the most commonly used
method for assessing situation awareness
(Endsley, 1988; 1989). While this is a
16
useful technique with high face validity,
there has been little discussion about
how to select probes for different
situations. We would advocate a
systematic approach to the use of probes
that includes questions about information
and indicators that vary systematically in
their relevance to the task in immediate
focus and to the overall status of the
aircraft and flight plan. These would
include spatial orientation, environment
(weather, traffic), current goals and
procedures, contingency plans, aircraft
systems status, aircraft performance,
diagnoses of malfunctions, and crew
responsibilities and knowledge (See
Table 1).
Recall of Displays
Another strategy for measuring situa-
tion awareness is to test the ease with
which the relevant details of a display
can be committed to memory. The
rationale for this technique comes from
studies of expertise in a number of
domains, most notably chess (Chase &
Simon, 1973). The findings from these
studies consistently show that experts
have a better memory for the details of a
display (e.g., the positions of playing
pieces on a chess board), after a brief
viewing, than do novices. The
consensus from this research is that
experts are able to perceive meaningful
patterns in the display that reduce
memory load. This conclusion has been
supported by the additional finding that
experts are no better than novices at
remembering incoherent displays (e.g.,
randomly placed chess pieces).
Because recall is strongly affected by
meaningfulness, and the perception of
meaningful events is the essence of
situation awareness (Vicente, 1988),
intentional recall of relevant displays can
serve as an index of situation awareness.
Category Judgments
This technique involves measure-
ment of the time taken to judge display
inputs as "normal" or "abnormal." The
rationale for this measure is similar to
that for the recall measure. The same
skilled perception (i.e., situation aware-
ness) that allows for "chunking" of the
information, also should enable the per-
ceiver to notice deviations from the ex-
pected pattern. We envision this tech-
nique being used with short vignettes
that terminate with a frozen display. The
viewer's task would be to rate the situa-
tion as normal or anomalous as quickly
as possible. Normal displays would
contain readings that would be likely to
occur. An abnormal display could be
constructed for each normal display by
changing one or more of the indicators to
a value that could not occur in a real sit-
uation.
Information Seeking
The last strategy consists of tech-
niques for determining the information to
which the crewmember is attending at
any given time. For example, it can be
used to determine whether and why a
crewmember failed to look at the critical
portion of a display in a scenario. One
way of accomplishing this goal is to re-
strict the available information sources to
those that the person actively seeks. In
other words, no information from dis-
plays, communication sources, or flight
aids would be presented unless it were
specifically requested. The crewmember
would be instructed how to obtain the
needed information, perhaps through the
use of a menu or touch screen. A possi-
ble disadvantage of this technique is that
the viewer might fail to solicit informa-
tion that would have been attended had it
been present. A more sophisticated, but
labor-intensive way of accomplishing the
same goal would be to record eye-
movements during the scenario.
MODEL-BASED MEASURES OF
SITUATION AWARENESS
We are proposing the use of model-
based measures as a supplement to the
scenario-based and direct measures dis-
cussed above. The scenario-based mea-
sures allow us to create circumstances in
which situation awareness is particularly
important and observe whether the
crew's response is reflective of that
awareness. The more direct measures
allow us to observe those aspects of situ-
ation awareness on which the crewmem-
ber can report or that can be inferred
from specifically designed performance
measures. We propose the use of model-
referenced performance measures in an
effort to probe deeper into the state of
the cognitive structures that support ef-
fective situation awareness.
The kind of human-machine perfor-
mance model to which we are referring
includes: (1) a scenario driver to set the
context in which the behavior is to be
measured, (2) a representation of those
aspects of a system being controlled that
impact on the human performance re-
quirements, (3) a representation of the
goals and tasks that the human machine-
system team is required to perform, in-
cluding descriptions of the procedures by
which they are performed and (4) repre-
sentations of primitive human perfor-
mance capacities and limitations, such as
visual scanning rules, the state of infor-
mation in memory, methods for assign-
ing task priorities, and resource-based
workload limits.
Examples of such models are the
PROCRU model that describes the be-
havior of the pilot-flying and pilot-non-
flying of a Boeing 727 accomplishing a
final approach and landing (Baron,
Zacharias, Muralidharan, and Landcraft,
1980), and the AIRT model that de-
scribes the behavior of the controllers in
an Air Force forward air control center.
(Corker, Cramer and Henry, 1990).
While human performance models of
this kind have been and are being devel-
oped, the approach we are suggesting is
speculative, since they have not previ-
ously been used in support of real-time
performance analysis in tandem with an
on-going simulation test of human per-
formance. However, we believe the
state-of-the-art has advanced to the point
that exploring such an application is now
a productive research strategy.
To apply models for the assessment
of situation awareness in flight deck
simulation studies, one would build a
model of the flight deck control and dis-
play environment, of the behavior of the
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aircrewthatwasvalid for theflight crew
tasks under study, and a simplified
model of the aircraft performance. The
model would be run in parallelwith the
actualaircrewparticipatingin the simu-
lation trial. It would be setup with the
same scenario background and flight
plans. Information receivedby the hu-
man crew would also be input to the
modelledcrew. This informationwould
includedataaboutthestateof theaircraft
and its systemsthat is available from
flight deck displays and the content of
ATC communications. Modelled crew
actions would affect the modelled air-
craft state.
Themodelledsystemwouldberegu-
larly up-datedwith information from the
actualon-going flight simulator trial to
insurethat the modelledsystemdid not
getout of synchronizationwith thereal-
time performanceof the humancrew in
thesimulatedaircraft. To theextentthat
themodelledsystemis a valid represen-
tation of the real system,then the crew
behaviorwill mimic thebehaviorof the
humancrew.
When a successful mimic is
achieved,then the analysthasavailable
in the model a representationof the in-
ternal stateof the crewmemberat each
momentin time. This representationis
exactlywhat is requiredto undertakean
in-depth analysis of the state of the
crewmember'ssituation awareness.At
critical instantsone could examine the
current contents of the crewmember's
memory representation; one could in-
spect and evaluate the priority ordering
of the queue of tasks waiting to be ac-
complished. Tracking the contents of
memory and task execution protocols
would provide clues to points where lack
of situation awareness is due to exces-
sive monitoring requirements or task
loading. Similarly it will highlight the
source of differences in awareness that
can be attributed to different display con-
figurations or approaches to automation.
In short it can provide substantial aug-
mentation to situation awareness data
without disrupting the conduct of the live
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simulation itself or relying on the self re-
ports of crew-member subjects.
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES ON SITUATION
AWARENESS: TWO EXAMPLES
To conclude, we present two exam-
ples of how these strategies for assessing
situation awareness can be used to evalu-
ate the effect of proposed cockpit aids.
The first example concerns a panoramic
display that is intended to increase spa-
tial awareness during landings. The sec-
ond concerns a fault finder designed to
increase the aircrew's awareness of sys-
tem malfunctions.
EXAMPLE 1: EVALUATION OF
PANORAMIC FLIGHT PATH DISPLAYS
An evaluation of a proposed new
cockpit display that provides a
panoramic, 70 degree field of view of the
landing strip under instrument flight
conditions is currently being undertaken
by Russell Parish's group at NASA-
LaRC. The display depicts the intended
flight path as a row of goal posts along
an imaginary pathway in the sky. A per-
spective view of a series of rectangles
shows the position of the plane with re-
spect to the intended flight path. At a
point when the landing strip would come
into view out the window, it is repre-
sented on the display in its proper per-
spective. Other aircraft operating in the
near-by airspace are also indicated and
are enclosed in an attention-getting red-
outline box if they become a collision
threat.
This panoramic display is being com-
pared to the use of conventional instru-
ments, including a plan-view navigation
display and conventional attitude dis-
play. Special scenarios consisting of a
final approach and landing are being
used for this purpose. The investigators
are interested in how each of the displays
affects the pilot's ability to maintain spa-
tial awareness and control of the aircraft
in a range of circumstances. We de-
scribe their assessment design here be-
cause it is illustrative of many of the
strategies we have suggested.
Introduce Subtle or Misleading
Information
In some scenarios, a difficult flight
path with several turns will be required.
At the most difficult point in the flight
path, another aircraft in the vicinity will
unexpectedly turn onto a collision course
with the aircraft under control of the
pilot under study. The measure of
situation awareness will be the time to
detect the offending aircraft and the
nature of the actions taken to correct it.
Introduce Interruptions
During other scenarios, the screen
will go blank for five seconds and the
plane will return to an unexpected loca-
tion somewhat off the flight path. The
pilot will be required to assess the new
location and execute suitable maneuvers
to return to the intended flight path. The
measure of situation awareness is the
time needed to initiate corrective action
and the nature of any maneuver errors
committed in returning to the intended
path. It seems likely that the panoramic
display will greatly facilitate this task,
but quantitative measures of the differ-
ences in display conditions will be illu-
minating. Another potential measure
would be the degree to which subjects'
maneuvering of the plane during the time
the screen was blanked conformed to the
original flight path. Close conformity
under the panoramic display condition
would suggest that the display had fos-
tered the development of a good mental
model that allowed for accurate predic-
tion of the intended flight path.
Queries
Direct measure of spatial awareness
will be obtained by interrupting some of
the scenarios at unexpected points and
asking subjects questions about the loca-
tion of their aircraft and other aircraft in
the area. The evaluation of spatial
awareness, as illustrated by this study, is
perhaps the most straightforward appli-
cation of our approach. Yet it has re-
quired considerable creativity on the part
of the evaluation team. The assessments
of situation awareness outside of the
spatial domain, we suspect, will require
even more ingenuity. For purposes of
discussion, in the next example we con-
sider how we would go about evaluating
situation awareness regarding system
malfunctions.
EXAMPLE 2: FAULT-FINDER
Much thought is going into the de-
sign of fault-finding aids. The Midlands
Airline accident (NTSB, 1989), in which
a crewmember erroneously turned off the
good, fight engine instead of the defec-
tive, left one causing the airplane to
crash on landing when the left engine
failed, has provided a cogent example of
a case where such an aid might have
been advantageous. Although the air-
crew consulted the relevant instruments
before making the decision, they appar-
ently did not interpret them correctly.
For purposes of this discussion, we con-
sider how we would go about comparing
some of the new aids that are being de-
veloped to enhance awareness of system
malfunctions (e.g., Abbott, 1990;
Hudlicka, Corker, Schudy, & Baron,
1989). These aids perform one or more
of the following functions: indicate
whether instrument readings for various
system parameters are within the
expected range, produce hypotheses
about possible malfunctions, and suggest
procedures for dealing with the
malfunction.
We would first design some scenar-
ios in which a malfunction occurred and
observe crew performance with the dif-
ferent flight aids. To increase the sensi-
tivity of our measures, we would intro-
duce factors into the scenario that in-
crease the difficulty of attaining situation
awarene ss:
Introduce Subtle or Misleading
Information
The Midlands accident (NTSB,
1989) provides some useful suggestions.
The accident report points to problems of
misleading and subtle information.
Misleading information (the coincidental
cessation of vibrations and smoke when
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the good engine was turned off) caused
the crew to think they had turned off the
defective engine and to disregard the in-
strument readings. Subtle information
(the 16 degree roll to the left after the au-
topilot was turned off but before the right
engine was throttled back) was not no-
ticed by the pilot, although it should
have provided an indication that the left
engine was not functioning properly.
Introduce Interruptions
We would again turn to the Midlands
incident for inspiration. The flight crew
in that scenario was diverted by the fol-
lowing string of interruptions: the need
to communicate with the passengers via
the cabin address system, a weather in-
formation advisory, the need to repro-
gram the flight management system,
ATC messages concerning a new radar
heading, further descent clearance and a
new radio frequency, checklist require-
ments, a radio call requesting that a test
call be placed to the aerodrome fire ser-
vice, and distracting radio calls from
other aircraft on the same frequency.
These interruptions may have played a
significant role in the incident because
they prevented the pilot from returning
to a conversation with the copilot in
which he was just beginning to question
the evidence that had led them to shut
down the wrong engine.
Second, we would use several kinds
of direct measures of situation aware-
ness, as discussed above:
Queries
We would ask questions to probe the
crewmember's understanding of various
aspects of system functioning either dur-
ing or after the scenario. The accident
report from the Midlands incident, i,1 its
thoroughness, provides a model of how
to accomplish this task. In the aftermath
of that incident, information was ob-
tained from the crewmembers about: the
meaning of the indicators -- how reliable
the readings are on this and other aircraft
(this question was important because vi-
bration readings which were accurate in
this aircraft had been unreliable on other
20
aircraft); the meaning attributed to vari-
ous symptoms, such as smoke in the
cabin (this question was important be-
cause this aircraft was different from
many others, in which only the fight en-
gine ventilates into the cabin); or the
failure of the right engine to restart when
it was engaged at the last minute (the en-
gine start levers, or fuel valves, were
found in the cutoff position after the
accident).
Recall of Displays
One problem with the instruments for
indicating engine malfunctions that be-
came clear in the Midlands accident is
that it was difficult to perceive patterns.
Recall of the information in briefly pre-
sented displays, therefore, would be one
measure that would be important for as-
sessing the effectiveness of the different
aids.
Category Judgments
Another way of assessing the mean-
ingfulness of the various displays would
be to present displays of information for
both fight and left engines, where either
one, both, or neither was defective, and
have pilots make judgments as to which
were abnormal, as rapidly as possible.
Information Seeking or Recording of
Eye Movements
Finally, we would supplement the
above measures, if possible, with the
recording of eye movements to ascertain
how frequently and how early the aids
were consulted and how rapidly informa-
tion was extracted from them.
AUTOMATION AND SITUATION
AWARENESS
As has been suggested, one of the
motivations for measuring situation
awareness today is the interest in making
the introduction of new cockpit aids and
automation concepts more human cen-
tered. In this section we elaborate on the
problems that automation can introduce
and the potentially new situation aware-
ness requirements it invokes.
In the past the pilot obtained situa-
tion awareness by doing, by being di-
rectly involved in every aspect of the
flight. Information that supported situa-
tion awareness was a combination of that
which the pilot was compelled to seek in
order to be able to perform a task ade-
quately and the feedback that occurred as
a result of the pilot's actions. Situation
awareness was enhanced by the lack of
complexity. The danger, however, was
that the manual workload of controlling
the aircraft could be so high under cer-
tain conditions that the extra attention
that was required to construct good sit-
uation awareness was not available.
Automation can, and has relieved the
flight crew of many functions, thus low-
ering selected aspects of workload. It
could be argued that by using automation
the pilot has more time to actively seek
the information that allows him to be sit-
uationally aware. As we have argued in
previous sections, achieving situation
awareness is an active process of seek-
ing, prioritizing and interpreting infor-
mation. Successful accomplishment in-
curs a workload penalty; someone who
has no spare workload capacity because
he is manually controlling attitude,
speed, etc., will not have the same ability
to achieve situational awareness as
someone who has off-loaded part of the
manual workload to automation.
However, this eliminates the appar-
ently natural ability to construct situation
awareness "by doing". As automated
systems have been introduced, the pilot
has become more and more removed
from certain aspects of the flight. He no
longer is privy to all the raw data re-
quired to adequately perform a task
when that task is performed wholly or in
part by the automation (even when he is
responsible in the case of a failure). By
the same token, the feedback given to the
automation, which it requires in order to
assess its dynamic performance, and the
inputs the automation must make to
compensate for a changing situation, are
not always passed along to the pilot be-
cause they are considered irrelevant.
However, they can be highly relevant
when the pilot is asked to take over on
short notice in the event of a failure.
In addition, the introduction of au-
tomation adds many more information
elements and interactions that one must
keep track of. That is, each new piece of
automation becomes part of the situation
of which one must be aware. When a
pilot manually controls the attitude of the
aircraft, he must be aware of the chain of
effects of stick movement, control sur-
face movement, and the dynamics of re-
suiting attitude changes. When the au-
topilot is used, the pilot should still be
aware of these items and often is not.
Further, in the case of an unexpected
event, he should be aware of the charac-
teristics of the automation itself, such as:
current autopilot mode, if there is more
than one; factors or actions that will
cause it to disengage; the values that
drive it; and what happens if it fails.
This all puts additional situation aware-
ness requirements on the flight crew,
which technology-driven automation of-
ten does not make salient and when it
does, it is at times when the human pilot
is least able to cope with workload
demands of the unexpected event.
As a result, any kind of automation
that requires direct crew interaction in ei-
ther routine or back-up mode operation
expands the situation of which the pilot
must be aware. It adds more items to the
queue of information that must be
tracked and it adds layers of complexity
or abstraction to the situation so that the
workings and nature of the remote layers
are less observable.
Automation that is to be human cen-
tered must use the information manipula-
tion, communication and presentation ca-
pabilities associated with it to provide in-
formational support and feedback about
the state of the automation itself in an
expeditious manner. In the ideal case,
this cannot only compensate for the loss
of direct feedback and simplicity, but can
provide the pilot with perspectives that
were unavailable without the automation
(See Vicente & Rasmussen, 1990 for an
example in the domain of process con-
trol). Human-centered automation offers
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the potential of greater pilot situation
awareness than either no automation or
technology-driven automation, which, in
turn, should lead to improved overall
human-system performance and aircraft
safety.
CREW AWARENESS
The focus of the discussion of this re-
port has been on the situation awareness
of an individual crewmember, the pilot,
the co-pilot or where applicable the
flight engineer. There is also beginning
to be a literature on the topic of crew
awareness by which we mean the aware-
ness of the aggregate set of individuals
responsible for the safety and effective-
ness of the flight (Wellens, 1989; 1990).
Flight procedures identify that some
features of awareness are required of the
pilot-flying while others are required of
all crewmembers.
Assessing crew awareness focuses
attention on the communication pro-
cesses among crewmembers.
Information on flight instruments is
available to both crewmembers; however
at critical moments one is usually attend-
ing to out-of-cockpit sources while the
other is "flying the instruments". When
one is completing a check list, it is im-
portant that the other be aware of non-
routine findings when they have a po-
tential impact on current or future deci-
sions. A lack of crew awareness may
have played a role in the Midlands inci-
dent as well. Evidently, the flight atten-
dants who saw flames coming out of the
left engine were unaware that the pilot
thought the right engine was the defec-
tive one. To make matters worse, the pi-
lot was unaware that the flight attendants
who had seen the flames in the left en-
gine, had not heard his announcement.
As was discussed earlier, experienced
and effective crews discuss precautions,
although they may never need them,
while workload is low so that they have
little need for discussion when a problem
arises. Less effective crews, by contrast,
wait until a critical need arises before
they begin to communicate, making for a
very high workload (Orasanu, 1990).
As we begin to think about the intro-
duction of a computer-based intelligent
flight assistant in the cockpit, the concept
of crew awareness is further complicated
because there may be critical information
that this system takes account of that is
not made available to the human
crewmembers. The design of cockpit
displays for such an assistant must con-
sider the needs for crew awareness as
well as for particular individual
crewmembers.
The objective measurement of crew
awareness is only beginning to be ad-
dressed. It will require the simultaneous
and independent assessment of the
awareness of each crewmember, using
one or more of the methods we have dis-
cussed, and the correlation of the indi-
vidual results. It may also require the
scoring of the content of communication
messages to identify the points in time at
which information is shared.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Situation awareness, as a feature of
aircrew performance, is receiving in-
creased attention as new display tech-
nologies become available and higher
levels of automation are being proposed
for flight deck implementation. As a
brief, comprehensive definition we quote
Endsley,
"The perception of the elements in
the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their
meaning and the projection of their sta-
tus in the near future" (Endsley, 1988).
Measuring situation awareness re-
quires understanding the processes un-
derlying the achievement of it as well as
the kinds of informational "products"
that result. These processes are charac-
terized by a range of cognitive activities
from automatic effortless processing to
complex effortful inferential reasoning.
Successful achievement of situation
awareness may also be studied by exam-
ining the different methods used by ex-
perts to minimize the impact of exces-
sive attention demands.
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We emphasizethree approachesto
measurement strategy: (1) creative de-
sign of scenario contexts that emphasize
the demand for the aircrew's attentional
resources and the need to interpret subtle
and sometimes misleading clues, (2) di-
rect probes and experimental manipula-
tions designed to tap the knowledge and
strategies used by the aircrew during a
scenario or brief vignette, and (3) infer-
ences from a computer program that
models the actions, knowledge states and
information processing strategies of the
crewmember.
The design of flight deck-related au-
tomation can have many subtle effects
on the requirements for and ease of
achieving situation awareness because, at
once, it adds elements to the array of
systems that must be monitored at the
same time that it takes away information
that previously was obtained by direct
interaction with the aircraft. Therefore,
improved design of human-centered au-
tomation can be facilitated by systematic
objective measurement of the situation
awareness associated with new designs.
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